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Executive Summary 
This report presents a set of pragmatic and workable generic procedures, suggested best 
practices and other recommendations and observations for the safe and sustainable closure 
of geological CO2 storage sites. These have been distilled from the results of the CO2CARE 
project and represent the most important messages that will be of benefit to Regulators, 
storage site Operators and other stakeholders.  
Key observations and recommendations are set out below. 
Transfer of responsibility for all legal obligations for a storage site from the Operator to the 
Competent Authority (CA) marks a radical change in the balance of responsibilities between 
stakeholders in a storage project. The CA is ultimately the representative of the public, and 
this implies an acceptance by the public of the benefits and associated liabilities. 
Acceptance of the Transfer Report and transfer of responsibility for all legal obligations for 
the site to the CA marks the end of a process that began with site selection and a permit 
application by the Operator many years previously. It is vital that a relationship based on 
transparency and openness should have developed between the Operator and Regulator 
during that period, to build mutual confidence into the regulatory process and, ultimately, the 
transfer of responsibility. Continuity of knowledge through changes of personnel should also 
be ensured. This, together with the regular reporting requirements that most jurisdictions 
require (e.g. those required under the EU Directive) should help to ensure that the transfer of 
responsibility proceeds smoothly and to the satisfaction of all parties involved. 
 
When CO2 injection at a storage site has ceased, the storage site is described in the EU CO2 
Storage Directive as being closed and the project life cycle enters the post-closure phase, 
leading to transfer of responsibility. During the post-closure phase the wells will not 
necessarily be sealed immediately, the site will continue to be monitored and reservoir 
management will continue, in accordance with the project risk assessment and management 
plan, which will have been updated at site closure.  
 
The main purpose of reservoir management in the post-closure phase is to demonstrate that 
the key regulatory requirements for transfer of storage site liability to the Competent 
Authority have been met. In the EU CO2 Storage Directive these are: 
 
• Observed behaviour of the injected CO2 conforms to the modelled behaviour 
 
• No detectable leakage 
 
• The storage site is evolving towards a situation of long-term stability  
 
Meeting these criteria involves demonstrating understanding of reservoir processes, the 
ability to make robust predictions of future behaviour and providing assurance against 
leakage.  
 
Demonstrating conformance between predictive models of reservoir performance and 
monitoring observations is technically challenging because a unique and perfect match is 
near-impossible to achieve. CO2CARE recommends that conformance is based on 
demonstrating that predictive modelling capability increases systematically with time as 
monitoring data is progressively acquired. This indicates that storage processes are well 
understood and the modelling approach is robust. 
 
If predictive modelling is robust, uncertainties will progressively reduce as more monitoring 
data is acquired through time. Nevertheless it is necessary to maintain a sufficiently wide 
range of predictive scenarios, such that any reasonable outcome will fall within it. 
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Measurements that fall outside the predicted range are likely to be embarrassing for the 
Operator and may trigger remediation requirements if they look likely to result in unexpected 
outcomes. It is important therefore to focus strongly on the end-members of the predicted 
range, particularly those that might lead to divergent future outcomes. Regulators should 
realise that a level of residual uncertainty in the predictive modelling is unavoidable, and is 
acceptable provided that end-members of the predicted range will not lead to unacceptable 
outcomes. 
At the point of transfer of liability, predictive models calibrated by monitoring data will have a 
residual uncertainty envelope, but this should be sufficiently small for unexpected or 
divergent future outcomes to be ruled out. 
The definition of no detectable leakage is problematical. All leakage monitoring systems 
have a finite (and site-specific) CO2 detection capability. To be fit for purpose, the detection 
capability of the monitoring system needs to be able to detect a sufficiently small amount or 
rate of leakage to ensure the necessary health, safety, environmental and greenhouse gas 
mitigation objectives are met. As far as the emissions mitigation objective is concerned, a 
number of studies have suggested that leakage rates of around 0.01% per year or less 
would ensure effective mitigation performance. It is recommended that regulators use the 
term “no detectable leakage” in the context of whether the leakage monitoring system can 
show a site is performing effectively in terms of health, safety, environmental and 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation. 
Emphasis should be on achieving the earliest possible detection of CO2 migration from the 
reservoir, to maximise the time available for suitable mitigation actions to be implemented 
before leakage (migration of CO2 out of the Storage Complex), actually occurs, and also to 
provide sufficient time for full remediation prior to any planned transfer date. 
Proving that a site is evolving towards long-term stability is challenging because predictive 
modelling of the longer-term processes is subject to significant uncertainty, and so far we 
have little field experience of post-injection processes. Full use of additional analogue 
information is important therefore, to develop a logical case for site stabilization. Use should 
be made of monitoring data from sites already in the post-injection period (e.g. Nagaoka), 
experimental data and relevant geological analogues which demonstrate stabilization 
processes in similar circumstances and the time-scales on which they operate. 
 
Best practice in well abandonment starts with ensuring the integrity of the well by its proper 
construction and safe operation. New wells in a CO2 storage site should be constructed 
according to best practice for long-term integrity in a corrosive CO2-rich environment. This 
means selecting appropriate materials and ensuring the long-term geomechanical and 
geochemical integrity of the wells. However, not all wells in CO2 storage complexes will have 
been constructed and operated with CO2 storage in mind. The risks associated with these 
older wells, including abandoned wells, should be assessed and, if necessary, remediation 
plans should be prepared for them. 
 
The main elements of managing the environmental and safety risks of CO2 storage, namely 
risk assessment, monitoring and the application, if necessary, of corrective measures, are 
well embedded in the rules of the EU Storage Directive. CO2CARE has developed a detailed 
scheme of milestones and procedures to be followed to ensure the safe and sustainable 
closure of CO2 storage sites. It was observed that the EU Storage Directive and its 
associated Guidance Documents propose minimum periods to fulfil certain key criteria, 
which are not based on any scientific fundamentals. It is recommended that the EU Directive 
could be amended such that all decisions as to whether a criterion for the safety of a site has 
been met should be based on technical criteria only and should not be linked to prescriptive 
time spans. 
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The Storage Complex should be defined at all stages of the project life cycle from the 
Characterisation phase onwards, because it is a fundamental concept in the Storage 
Directive. The term storage complex means the storage site and surrounding geological 
domain which can have an effect on overall storage integrity and security, that is, secondary 
containment formations. Views of other stakeholders involved or potentially involved in this 
volume and area should be addressed in the transfer report. The limits of the Storage 
Complex could be redefined at any point in the project.  
Possible interactions with the site from future operations (CO2 storage or other uses), and 
other legitimate users of the subsurface or marine environment, should be considered in the 
transfer report, and any potential hazards of this kind should be identified to the CA. 
Recommendations for risk reduction, risk management and mitigation/remediation options 
for potential post-transfer interactions with other subsurface operations should also be 
included in the transfer report. That said, ultimately, only CAs can assess the risks that might 
arise from operation and closure of multiple assets within a storage formation or region. 
The regulators participating in the CO2CARE project indicated that liabilities for certain risks 
may remain with the Operator post-transfer. It is recommended that the EC should 
investigate these views further as they may have implications for the Directive or the way in 
which it is implemented in practice. 
As CO2 storage is a multi-generational operation, consideration should be given to what 
tools and data should be transferred to the CA. Models may need to be used post-transfer, if 
a significant irregularity or leakage was detected.  
Finally, communication and engagement with the public is something that should start very 
early in the CO2 storage project life cycle – as soon as, or even before, a site is selected. 
Communication and engagement then should continue throughout the project life cycle, 
including during closure and up to and beyond the transfer of responsibility for the site to the 
Competent Authority. 
 
 
  
D5.4 Best Practice Guidelines 
8 
 
Introduction 
 
CO2CARE supports the large-scale demonstration of CCS technology by developing and 
testing procedures and best practices for the safe and sustainable closure of geological CO2 
storage sites. These are intended to provide information to operators, regulators and the 
wider public about how the regulatory requirements for the closure of CO2 storage sites and 
the subsequent transfer of responsibility for the site from the site operator to the State, can 
be met.  
Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Union, on the geological storage of carbon dioxide 
(henceforth the Directive) sets specific requirements for both the transfer of responsibility of 
geological CO2 storage sites after injection has definitely ceased and for the abandonment of 
the storage site.  
Before such a transfer can be approved it is required that: 
a) all available evidence indicates that the stored CO2 will be completely and 
permanently contained 
b) the financial obligations have been fulfilled 
c) the site has been sealed and the injection facilities have been removed1 
 
In addition, the operator has to demonstrate: 
a) the conformity of the actual behaviour of the injected CO2 with the modelled 
behaviour 
b) the absence of any detectable leakage 
c) the storage site is evolving towards a situation of long-term stability 
 
In addition to the Directive, the European Commission has issued four Guidance Documents 
(henceforth GDs) that provide advice on implementing the Directive, of which GD3: Criteria 
for the Transfer of Responsibility to the Competent Authority (CA) is the most relevant to the 
closure of CO2 storage sites and transfer of responsibility from the operator to the State. 
However, the suggestions in the GDs have not yet been implemented in the Directive and 
therefore not binding law. 
 CO2CARE uses the three active European CO2 injection and storage sites: Sleipner 
(offshore Norway), K-12B (offshore Netherlands) and Ketzin (onshore Germany) as trial sites 
for the development and application of procedures and best practices. It also draws on 
experiences at six other CO2 storage or analogue storage sites worldwide (Nagaoka, Otway, 
Rousse, Frio, Wallula and Montmiral). This means that the real, practical issues that may be 
encountered in the future closure and long-term post-closure safety of these sites have been 
examined. As a result, a set of pragmatic and workable generic procedures and best 
practices have been developed. These are summarised in the main body of this report. 
 
Following this Introduction the Best Practice Recommendations are arranged as follows: 
                                               
1 There could be exceptions to this: in the ‘contract’ between the CA and storage operator, it may be agreed that 
the CA has the option to takeover not only the responsibility but also the operatorship of either the storage 
and/or the injection facilities. This may be efficient, if further storage sites could be served from the injection 
facility and/or the storage has not been filled to its capacity by the first operator. 
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Section 1: Recommendations for well abandonment 
Section 2: Recommendations for post-closure reservoir management 
Section 3: Recommendations for risk management 
Section 4: Recommendations for transfer of responsibility from the Operator to the State 
Section 5: Recommendations related to communication with the public  
Section 6: Recommendations for the possible modification of Directive 2009/31/EC of the 
European Union, on the geological storage of carbon dioxide (henceforth the Directive) and 
its associated Guidance Documents (henceforth GDs). 
Sections 1-5 correspond to the main Work Packages of the CO2CARE project. 
 
  
D5.4 Best Practice Guidelines 
10 
 
1. Recommendations for post-closure wellbore management 
 
Best practice in well abandonment starts with ensuring the initial integrity of the well by its 
proper construction and safe operation. New wells in a CO2 storage site should be 
constructed according to best practice for long-term integrity in a corrosive CO2-rich 
environment. However, not all wells within the Storage Complex will have been constructed 
and operated with CO2 storage in mind. The risks associated with older wells, including 
abandoned wells, should be assessed and, if necessary, appropriate remediation plans 
should be prepared. 
 
1.1. Well abandonment 
1.1.1. Recommendations from a review of current regulatory frameworks and 
practices  
 
Active (open) wells in a CO2 storage site 
A review of current regulatory frameworks and practices in CO2 storage site abandonment2 
showed that most CO2 storage-specific regulations and guidance do not stipulate particular 
materials, methods or protocols that should be used for plugging CO2 injection or monitoring 
wells, or the performance standards that should be achieved. This is probably because CO2 
storage is a relatively new technology – practice is actively evolving – and the techniques 
employed need to be tailored to the specifics of a given site.  
However, national or jurisdictional regulations on the abandonment of hydrocarbon wells 
and, other types of deep injection wells, commonly specify both the outcomes required and 
some specific requirements, e.g. the lengths of plugs required in abandoned wells and 
where they should be placed3. Most sets of regulations agree that proper well abandonment 
for isolation of subsurface reservoirs should:  
• Prevent any leakage of fluids up the well to the surface 
• Prevent all physical hazards potentially induced by the well 
• Prevent any migration of contaminants between formations  
• Prevent the possibility of hydrologic communication between originally separated 
aquifer systems 
It is recommended that existing abandonment regulations should be adapted for application 
to CO2 storage wells and should:  
• Cover any open wells in a CO2 storage site, i.e. injection wells, monitoring wells and 
(contingency) wells kept open in case needed during the project 
• Not allow well plugging until after: 
                                               
2 CO2CARE D1.1 International regulatory requirements on CO2 geological storage and site 
abandonment (http://www.co2care.org). 
3 CO2CARE D1.2 Report on the current site abandonment methodologies in relevant industries 
(http://www.co2care.org). 
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o The acquisition and analysis of any required monitoring data (e.g. final well 
logging) 
o The acceptance by the Competent Authority (CA) that the monitoring data is 
of satisfactory quality and the analysis indicates the well is in a satisfactory 
condition for abandonment 
• Require tubing to be removed 
• Specify plugging across the injection zone and the caprock  
• Include and regularly update plugging material requirements using knowledge gained 
from the performance testing of plugging materials in CO2 environments  
 
Previously abandoned wells in a storage complex 
Previously abandoned wells often do not comply with recommended standards for CO2 
storage. If adequate regulations were not in place at the time of abandonment, a proper risk 
evaluation of the actual state of the well barrier materials is challenging. Consequently, the 
integrity of old wells, particularly if critical data is missing, is difficult to predict.  
 
A risk assessment of legacy wells and the specification of potential preventive measures (if 
required) should have been part of the characterisation phases of a CO2 storage project i.e. 
it should be in place long before the site is closed. However, it is recommended that a 
general risk assessment procedure that describes how to deal with previous abandoned 
“old” wells penetrating the storage complex should be developed. 
 
1.1.2. Recommendations from a review of current industry best practices 
Experiences from CO2 storage site demonstration projects and industrial CO2-EOR 
applications indicate that CO2 storage site abandonment can be performed safely, provided 
that the following have been properly undertaken: 
• A full Storage Site and Storage Complex characterisation 
 
• An accurate well integrity assessment 
 
• Operational activities performed according to industry best practices, particularly 
proper cement placement and well operations 
 
• A comprehensive project risk assessment which has been progressively updated 
through the entire lifetime of the storage project 
 
• Design of a risk-based monitoring plan 
 
• Design of a risk-based remediation plan  
 
• Definition and, if required, execution of preventative and mitigating measures 
 
It is recommended that national and jurisdictional guidance on practices related to CO2 
geological storage should provide more specific information about: 
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• How to abandon a CO2 storage well 
 
• How to demonstrate the caprock integrity in and around a well 
 
• The materials which are recommended for use in the construction and 
abandonment of CO2 storage wells: 
 
o It is recommended that new, CO2-resistant materials, such as sealing gels 
or CO2-resistant cements should be tested thoroughly in CO2-rich 
environments before considering their application in CO2 storage activities. 
Special attention should be paid to the long term performance of well 
barrier materials exposed to the corrosive CO2 environment.  
 
It is recommended that particular care should be paid to both cement sheath placement 
(during construction) and cement plug placement at abandonment. It is also recommended 
that more detailed procedures describing cement bond evaluation and integrity testing 
activities should be provided. 
It is recommended that further research should be undertaken into pancake plugging 
(Randhol et al. 2007). Pancake plugging of wellbores is thought to provide a promising 
solution for plugging the wellbore effectively e.g. Kuhn et al. 2013, but it is not a standard 
procedure. Should the operation fail, the placement has to be repeated (if possible) or even 
higher leakage risks could be generated. In such cases, the remediation operations will be 
technically challenging and expensive. Highly deviated wells in particular may be prone to 
integrity problems due to improper cement placements and should be carefully evaluated by 
state of the art monitoring tools (e.g. ultrasonic or calliper tools). It may be difficult or even 
impossible to place an effective pancake plug in highly deviated wells. 
 
1.1.3.  Summary of experience with abandoned CO2 wells 
Globally, there is little experience with purpose-designed CO2 storage wells at present – only 
a few such CO2 storage projects have been completed and there has been little published 
feedback about the details of well abandonment methods and performance of the materials 
used. However, after about 30 years of experience with CO2-floods, the CO2-EOR industry 
has a proven track record of safely injecting and storing residual CO2 in geological 
formations, and successfully plugging and abandoning CO2 injection wells (NETL, 2010). 
Hovorka and Tinker (2010) summarise the achievements of 38 years of CO2-EOR and refer 
to the relevance and importance of experiences on CO2-EOR for safe geological storage of 
CO2. The authors assess implications for reservoir management, monitoring and risk 
assessment in CO2 sequestration, and address well integrity issues and abandonment in 
generic terms. 
A recent review paper (Syed and Cutler 2010) summarises the improvements in wellbore 
materials used in the CO2-EOR industry. 
The CO2-EOR industry has also improved the design and operating methodologies for CO2 
injection wells, particularly in the following fields (Parker et al., 2009): 
• Selective use of corrosion-resistant materials and alloys for surface piping, metal 
component trim and speciality coating applications 
 
• Use of CO2-resistant elastomers, teflon, and nylon for packer elements and seals 
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• Use of novel tubular coatings or liners using plastic, epoxy resin or fibre glass/resin 
materials 
 
• Use of speciality cements and additives 
 
• Use of automatic controls and real time monitoring systems. 
 
A recent review (IEA-GHG 2010) provides a comprehensive overview of materials that 
should be used in CO2 injection and storage and the API lists materials used in modern CO2-
EOR operations (Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1: Materials recommended by API for CO2 injection well design and construction (mostly 
WAG services; modified after Meyer, 2007). 
Component Materials 
Christmas Tree (Trim) 316 SS, Electroless Nickel plate, Monel 
Valve Packing and Seals Teflon, Nylon 
Wellhead (Trim) 316 SS, Electroless Nickel plate, Monel 
Tubing Glass Reinforced Epoxy (GRE) - lined carbon steel, 
Internally plastic coated carbon steel, Corrosion resistant 
alloy (CRA) 
Tubing Joint Seals Seal ring (GRE), Coated threads and collars (IPC) 
ON/OFF Tool, Profile Nipple Nickel plated wetted parts, 316 SS 
Packers Internally coated hardened rubber etc. Nickel plated wetted 
parts; corrosion resistant alloys particularly in old wells to 
improve sealing to worn casings 
Cements and cement additives API cements and/or acid resistant cements 
 
Additional information on new procedures and materials such as novel cement and sealing 
agents is provided in CO2CARE deliverable D1.24. 
1.1.4. Summary of the track record of abandoned hydrocarbon wells 
Generic studies of well leakage in hydrocarbon provinces with large numbers of abandoned 
oil and gas wells have been published. These provide an overview of well leakage rates in 
the oil and gas industry. Table 2 summarises the results from a number of studies reporting 
well leakage in North America. Marlow (1989) showed that 6% of the 6953 gas storage wells 
surveyed in the USA had leaked. The three main recorded causes of leakage were: 
• Microchanneling in cement 
• Poor cement job 
• Failed wellhead seals 
                                               
4 CO2CARE deliverable D1.2: Report on current site abandonment methodologies in the oil and gas 
and other relevant industries. 
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Table 2. Occurrence of leakage as reported by authors in six sample studies of well leakage. 
Source: Loizzo et al. (2011) 
 
 
Analysis of leakage data collected by the Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB) in 
Alberta (Bachu and Watson, 2006), from approximately 316,000 oil, gas and injection wells, 
has identified the critical parameters which are believed to have the greatest impact on well 
leakage in that region as: 
 
• Wellbore deviation: the occurrence of leakage was found to be significantly higher for 
deviated wells  
 
• Well Type: cased and abandoned wells were found to be subject to a greater 
likelihood of leakage than uncased drilled and abandoned wells. This difference may 
be a consequence of different regulation requirements for the different well types 
 
• Abandonment Method: abandonment by bridge plugs capped with cement was found 
to lead to larger failure rates than other abandonment methods, such as placing 
cement plugs across completed intervals using a balanced plug method, or setting a 
cement retainer and squeezing cement through perforations 
 
• Oil price and regulatory changes: A significant positive correlation was found 
between leakage occurrence and oil price 
 
• Cement job: The most important indicator for leakage was determined to be low 
cement top. The majority of casing failures were attributed to regions of poor and no 
cement in the annulus above the top of the injection/ production interval. 
Although over 11,000 CO2-EOR wells have been permitted in more than 40 years of CO2 
flooding in Texas, a study by CO2CARE of the regulatory records at the State Agency in 
charge of regulating the oil and gas industry (Railroad Commission of Texas) yielded no 
reported CO2 leakage events. However, there is evidence from the literature that well 
leakage does occur in the Texas region (Paine et al., 1999) and the possible reason for the 
absence of reported failures in CO2 wells may be that operators invest heavily in well 
preparation as part of CO2-flood development and leakage remediation. In addition, 
operators have financial incentives to maintain reliable operational control of the wells. 
Therefore preventive maintenance and effective monitoring are implemented.  
The greatest problem identified over decades of CO2-EOR operation has been old or historic 
wells which are not plugged or are plugged incorrectly. It is believed that many non-technical 
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parameters, such as regulatory background in the region, level of enforcement, and certain 
economic and social events, have a critical impact on well failure and leakage risk in these 
wells. Experience from the CO2-EOR wells in Texas suggests that in order to minimise the 
risk of well failure and potential well leakage, it is essential that mechanical integrity testing is 
a requirement for every fluid injection and gas storage well: 
1. Before the injection operations starts 
 
2. At least once every 5 years, or more often if required by the permit 
 
3. After any workover disturbing the seal between the tubing, packer, and casing or after 
any repair work performed on the casing 
 
4. When a request is made to suspend or re-activate the injection or disposal permit. 
 
Generically, it is clear that a significant proportion of well abandonment problems result from 
the poor application of drilling and completion protocols or the fact that wells are suspended 
for a long time without being properly abandoned (often because of costs). There is 
evidence that this is a situation that arises more from poor application of the regulations than 
through imperfect understanding of wellbore technical issues.  
In younger hydrocarbon provinces, detailed information is available on the completion and 
abandonment of each individual hydrocarbon well. Information is also available from many 
natural gas storage and geothermal operations 
1.2. Wellbore integrity  
 
A wellbore should ideally be mechanically and chemically stable from its initial construction 
onwards. This is extremely difficult to achieve because wellbores are constructed of layers of 
materials of different composition (steel, cement, etc.) and different properties (some expand 
or contract more than others during temperature changes, some deform in a brittle manner 
under stress and some in a ductile manner). Therefore inevitable variations in temperature 
and stress on a typical set of well construction materials during the project life-cycle mean 
that the bonds between the different layers of materials that provide well integrity might be 
compromised. Moreover, the strength and integrity of wellbore materials and surrounding 
strata may also be affected by reactions with formation brine acidified by dissolved CO2. 
There is potential for these effects, acting either individually or in combination, to create or 
enhance a leakage pathway for fluids. Consequently the wellbore’s likely stress path and the 
requirements for its mechanical and chemical stability over the full CO2 storage project life 
cycle need to be assessed during the site characterisation phase. This assessment should 
allow appropriate materials to be selected for new wells, and any potential remediation 
measures for existing wells to be planned. It is recommended that at least one further 
assessment of the stress history and long term geomechanical / geochemical stability of any 
open wellbore should be undertaken - prior to its abandonment. 
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1.2.1. Recommended workflow for geomechanical wellbore stability 
assessment 
 
It is recommended that the evaluation of geomechanical wellbore stability should include: 
(a) Examination of drilling and completion reports for existing wells to identify any non-
conformance or specific issues that occurred and identify any possible zones of weakness 
along the wellbore  
(b) Modelling the stress-state of the well over time 
(c) Plotting the predicted stress-state of the wellbore at various times in the project life cycle 
in a mechanical stress representation such as Mohr-Coulomb or Drucker-Pragger, the 
choice of representation depending on materials. This will determine whether stress 
variations applied to the wellbore completion over time result in stresses reaching the 
damage envelope (the stress region in which adverse effects on the wellbore integrity may 
occur).  
We have used this approach (Figure 1), to model wellbore geomechanical history at full 
scale on a portfolio of wells that have relevance to CO2 storage: the Ketzin CO2 injection 
well, an old oil and gas appraisal well near the Sleipner CO2 storage site, the Montmiral CO2 
producer well and a Rousse-analogue case for a strongly depleted gas producer well re-
used for CO2 injection.  
 
Figure 1. Graphical display of well mechanical history modelling workflow (prior to 
abandonment). 
Our investigations showed that in order to carry out such an analysis, it is of prime 
importance to understand: 
1. The mechanical properties of the formations drilled and the timing and effects of any 
potential CO2/water/rock reactions on these 
2. The initial state of stress of the formations drilled, and the timing of any likely 
changes in effective stress around the wellbore  
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3. The mechanical properties of the well construction materials and the timing and 
effects of any potential CO2/water/materials reactions on these 
4. The wellbore production history - the early, as well as the later, steps in the life of a 
well have to be modelled to confirm that wellbore mechanical history will not result in 
the wellbore materials entering their damage envelope over time.  
For new wells, it is recommended that the initial in situ state of stress in the rocks to be 
penetrated by the well should be evaluated prior to drilling, ideally during the site 
characterisation phase, and this evaluation should be updated after each relevant step in the 
well construction and operation. An estimate of in situ stresses can be made using local 
information on principal stresses if no direct measurements are available.  
The main challenge for geomechanical modelling of wells is the lack of data necessary to 
characterise likely wellbore materials behaviour, particularly with respect to what might 
happen at materials interfaces and the likely development of leakage pathways as a result of 
both thermo-mechanical and corrosion issues. It is necessary to know the mechanical 
properties and behaviour laws of the materials under a range of pressure and temperature 
conditions, in the presence of the fluids they may contact. It is likely to be easier to obtain the 
necessary physical properties data for steel and cement than for rocks. We suggest that rock 
cores might be systematically collected for these purposes during drilling operations and 
down-hole cement samples collected to better understand its initial in situ properties. This 
would help provide the best available material properties for the analysis.  
In order to maintain geomechanical stability during the operational phase of the project, it is 
recommended that a warning is activated each time the modelled stresses approach a 
failure criterion during operation of a well, generating an expert analysis. Should this indicate 
any need, an early remediation action or specific monitoring action should be deployed to 
minimise present and future risks 
It is recommended that an update of the initial well mechanical behaviour modelling, towards 
the end of the operation phase, should be used to inform the well plugging and 
abandonment programme during the post-closure, pre-transfer stage. 
After abandonment, the correct implementation of the state-of-the-art and local regulations 
for well abandonment should be verified. 
 
1.2.2. Geochemical and geomechanical interactions 
 
There is significant evidence that CO2 dissolved in brine will react with commonly used 
borehole cements and steels to some extent. The key issue is whether this will cause 
significant degradation in the isolating properties of the engineered seals over relevant 
performance timescales. There is a lack of observational data on this; laboratory 
experiments typically last months to a very few years, and recovered samples of borehole 
cements that have been exposed to high concentrations of dissolved CO2 down-hole have 
only been exposed for a few decades at most (Carey et al. 2007). Though predictive 
modelling may give a useful indication of long-term behaviour, it is important that future 
research provides constraints on these calculations – if only through the observation of 
similar naturally-occurring systems (e.g. natural analogues). 
Interaction of CO2 with cement via diffusive transport will cause a series of reaction fronts 
that progressively degrade cement minerals such as portlandite and calcium silicate hydrate 
(CSH) phases, and replace them with carbonate minerals and other phases such as silica. 
Initially new porosity can be created due to dissolution, but this tends to seal with 
subsequent precipitation (Rochelle & Milodowski 2013). Importantly, the carbonated cement 
D5.4 Best Practice Guidelines 
18 
 
retains significant mechanical stability. Very slow rates of carbonation may also produce a 
denser, lower permeability carbonated zone that is not seen in laboratory experiments. 
Indeed, for very low flow conditions, some naturally-carbonated, natural CSH minerals 
appear to have been carbonated to a depth of only about 1 cm even after 10,000 years 
reaction - under near-surface conditions (Rochelle & Milodowski 2013). Whilst limited 
carbonation may not be a major issue in terms of short-term sealing longevity, continued 
flow of CO2-rich water past cement may cause the dissolution / leaching of secondary 
carbonate phases in the carbonated cement, so flow pathways may increase in size over 
extended time periods. That said, if the host rock contains a significant amount of carbonate 
minerals, migrating CO2-rich water may already be saturated with respect to these, and 
leaching of the carbonated cement will be minimised. Knowledge of host rock mineralogy 
and fluid chemistry is therefore important in terms of assessing potential overall cement 
performance. 
Within a borehole setting, there will be interfaces between cement and wall-rock, and also 
cement and borehole steel. Any imperfections along these will provide potential flow 
pathways if there is a driver for fluid flow. Indeed studies of borehole cement from a 30 year 
old well show evidence for CO2 migration over several metres along these interfaces (Carey 
et al. 2007).  
Wellbores in CO2 storage reservoirs are often subjected to fluctuating pressure and 
temperature conditions, with potential damage to the well infrastructure, so it is critical that 
interfaces are initially well sealed (there is a good ‘cement job’). It is also important that the 
well is not exposed to extremes of temperature and/or pressure during its operational phase, 
as these may cause stresses to develop and, for example, for the steel well liner to ‘pull 
away’ from the cement, producing a microannulus along which CO2-rich fluids could flow. 
The increase in acidity from alkaline cement pore-waters to acidic CO2-rich waters will also 
increase rates of corrosion of borehole steel. Removal of (a section of) the steel liner prior to 
final plugging of the well may help alleviate some issues by reducing the number of 
interfaces and potentially reactive materials. 
During the operational lifetime of a well, periodic logging can provide some indication of the 
state of cement seals, and also allow for remedial action to be taken. However, once sealed 
and abandoned it will be very difficult to monitor for, or remediate, leaks at depth. It is 
important therefore to understand even slow geochemical processes affecting well stability, 
or design the borehole seals to cope well with a certain amount of carbonation (e.g. swelling 
slightly during carbonation to create a better seal over time). 
 
Experiments on wellbore materials 
In CO2CARE, a range of experiments carried out with various configurations of wellbore 
materials over a wide range of time-scales have provided additional information on wellbore 
geochemical and geomechanical stability5. 
Batch and flow experiments with samples that modelled steel casing cemented into a 
sandstone geological formation indicated that plugging of the porosity in the sandstone with 
minerals released from the cement helps prevent further cement degradation (Asahara et al. 
2013). This further contributes to securing the integrity of non-CO2-resistant wells.  
 
 
                                               
5 CO2CARe deliverables D2.1: “Report on laboratory wellbore experiments and near-wellbore 
numerical modelling” and D2.2: “Report on the analysis of chemical changes in wellbore materials 
with reference to Sleipner”. 
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Experiments to assess the effects of CO2 plus impurities on caprock and well materials 
A series of batch experiments using caprock, borehole cement and steel from Sleipner, and 
synthetic formation waters were conducted to assess the effect of low levels of SO2, NO2, or 
H2S impurities (individually, not in combination). The experimental conditions were 
representative of actual in-situ conditions within the caprock (30°C, 8 MPa [80 bar]). 
  
Caprock  
In general, the CO2-pressurised experiments appear to have attained approximate steady-
state concentrations for most dissolved species after about 2 months. The main solid phase 
reaction observed upon addition of CO2 was carbonate mineral dissolution. The addition of 
the impurities caused some increased reaction in comparison with previous experiments 
(Rochelle 2006) using only pure CO2 and N2 as a control.  
 
Borehole cement 
Borehole cement experiments involved small pucks of cement were run for two months. The 
presence of CO2 initiated significant carbonation reactions on and within the cement 
samples. Although there was extensive reaction of the cement pucks the reaction did not 
result in their wholesale disintegration. The presence of the impurities, other than the 
formation of gypsum when sulphur was present, did not significantly affect the nature of the 
reactions. 
  
Steel borehole liner 
The steel casing used was 13% chrome steel, which has been used in the casing joints in 
the Sleipner platform wells. The exposed parts of the injection well itself are made of 25% 
chrome steel. The most noticeable effect of dissolved CO2 was to initiate significant 
dissolution of the steel. The addition of the impurities caused some increased reaction in 
comparison with previous experiments (Rochelle 2006) using only pure CO2 and N2.  
In general for all the materials studied here, the addition of impurities to CO2 did cause some 
enhanced reaction but it is the presence of CO2 (with and without impurities) that has the 
most impact on the reactions of the caprock and the borehole infrastructure.  
 
Very long term experiments with pure CO2 
A 7-year experimental study completed in CO2CARE was undertaken to identify the long-
term (on a laboratory scale) geochemical impact of CO2 on minerals within the caprock at 
the Sleipner CO2 storage site. Batch experiments run for 7 years utilised caprock core 
material from Sleipner, with synthetic formation waters based upon measured compositions 
of nearby samples, and experimental conditions representative of the in-situ conditions 
within the caprock (30°C, 8 MPa [80 bar]). The experiments were pressurised with either N2 
or CO2, the former providing a ‘non-reacting’ control with which to compare the more 
reactive CO2 experiments. 
Fluid analytical data for the N2-pressurised experiments showed little or no reaction, 
indicating that the synthetic Utsira pore-water used in the experiments was a reasonable 
approximation for the actual in-situ pore-water composition. Reactions in experiments 
involving high-pressure CO2 were dominated by carbonate mineral dissolution. No significant 
changes in fluid chemistry were found compared to shorter-term experiments, which 
suggests that CO2 driven water-rock reactions were essentially complete early on in the 
experiments. There is some limited evidence that aluminosilicate minerals may have reacted 
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slowly over time. In terms of the overall impact of storing CO2 at Sleipner; other than some 
dissolution of carbonate phases, data from these experiments show no indication of major or 
deleterious reaction processes occurring. 
 
Experiments to assess the impact of pressure-temperature conditions on leakage potential 
at the wellbore casing-cement interface 
Long-term experiments in CO2CARE, simulating the sealing characteristics of well casing-
cement interface and the microannulus, for a range of depth, temperature and pressure 
conditions representative of CO2 geological storage sites have suggested that risks posed 
by leakage of CO2 from well casing and cement interface for shallow reservoir conditions 
(800-1,000m deep) are minimum as continuous flow (leakage) of CO2 would eventually seal 
the microannulus. On the other hand, potential leakages from wells in deeper fields 
(~3,000m deep), operating at higher temperatures and pressures, need to be assessed very 
carefully and a contingency plan for remediating such leakages has to be put in place as the 
same self-sealing behaviour was not observed for these conditions (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Variation of permeability with time during flow of CO2 through microannulus 
 
1.3. Novel well-abandonment methodologies 
 
A novel abandonment technique exploiting the ductile behaviour of rock salt was studied 
within CO2CARE (Deliverable D2.4). In areas where rock salt forms the sealing layer above 
potential CO2 storage reservoirs, its ductile behaviour under high P/T-conditions can be used 
to generate an impermeable, durable wellbore plug closing potential pathways in the 
wellbores (Orlic et al., 2008). In order to utilise this for permanent plugging of wellbores, a 
section of casing should be milled out at the rock salt formation depth, so that the salt can 
creep into the inner wellbore. The main benefit of this method would be to actually reinstate 
the cap-rock, with no corrodible engineering materials or material interfaces or annuli that 
could leak at the sealing level.  
The study showed an increase in the creep strain rate with depth due to increasing 
temperature and differential stresses. The creep strain rate decreases exponentially with 
decreasing wellbore radius. The shortest borehole closure time for a milled out open hole 
section of a 7 5/8” casing at a depth of 3.5 km is about 500 days. Backfilling of the wellbore 
with crushed salt and reducing the fluid pressure in the wellbore will speed up the process of 
wellbore closure.  
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It is recommended that the model results should be verified in a field trial in order to evaluate 
the applicability of this novel method. 
 
1.4. Well integrity logging  
1.4.1. Integrity logging in the Nagaoka CO2 storage project 
The Nagaoka CO2 Storage Project is an onshore pilot test conducted in the Minami-
Nagaoka oil and gas field. 10 400 tonnes of CO2 were injected into a saline aquifer at a 
depth of 1,100 m from July 2003 to January 2005 (Xue et al. 2006). There are four wells, 
one for injection and three for observation. In the latter, various technologies for monitoring 
the injected and stored CO2 have been successfully employed and post-injection monitoring 
is still ongoing on an annual basis.  
Well integrity examination has been conducted in the observation well closest to (40 m) the 
injection well. At reservoir depth, fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) was installed to conduct 
induction logging. In the 40 mm annulus between the casing and the formation, Class-A 
cement was poured to bond the FRP. According to logging data, the well has been exposed 
to injected CO2 since February 2004, around the 240th day after the start of the injection. 
Two types of tools were used to verify well integrity: cement bond logging (CBL) and 
ultrasonic logging (Nakajima et al. 2013). CBL is a proven technology, used to investigate 
both casing-cement bond (using the CBL signal amplitude) and cement-formation bond 
(using the Variable Density Log (VDL) wavetrain display), but its data represent the radially 
averaged status of cement bonding and do not identify the exact location of any poor 
bonding. Ultrasonic logging is capable of measuring the internal radius of the casing, the 
thickness of casing and the status of the well and cement indirectly. The tool provides data 
coverage over 360 degrees and, generally speaking, has higher resolution than the CBL, but 
is not proven to the same extent. The tools have their own advantages and disadvantages 
and both of them have been tested at Nagaoka. 
The two kinds of loggings have been conducted four times each, including one in the pre-
injection period. The recent CBL and ultrasonic log were conducted in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. Results from the CBL indicated that the casing and formation were well 
cemented before the CO2 injection, and the cementation remains sound despite being 
exposed to CO2 for more than eight years. Analysis from the ultrasonic logging shows that 
there has been no severe damage or deformation in the FRP casing at the reservoir depth, 
no significant change in casing thickness, and no significant change in the properties of the 
cement behind the FRP casing at the reservoir depth. In addition, it is noteworthy that two 
large earthquakes occurred closed to the site during and after the CO2 injection period but 
the well loggings show no clear difference between the results before and after the 
earthquakes. 
The 10,000-tonne storage test in Nagaoka provides us with time-lapse data dedicated to 
investigating the integrity of a well exposed to CO2 for eight years. Data acquired with two 
kinds of loggings show no clear evidence of CO2 leakage or wellbore degradation.   
Consequently, well logging with multiple tools (for example the combination of CBL and 
ultrasonic logging) is recommended for verifying well integrity.  
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2. Recommendations for post-closure reservoir management 
2.1. Conformance 
One of the three key regulatory requirements for transfer of responsibility for the storage site 
is to demonstrate conformity between predictive models of reservoir performance and 
monitoring observations. Robust conformance shows that the Operator understands how the 
site is performing and increases the likelihood of longer-term (post-transfer) predictions 
being reliable. 
The types, and quality, of monitoring data acquired will depend on the characteristics of the 
site. For example, seismic monitoring data is less likely to be acquired, or at least is likely to 
have a more restricted application, in a deep depleted gas field beneath a thick salt caprock 
such as K12-B than in a shallow aquifer storage site such as Sleipner. Experience from 
storage sites to date suggests critical performance measures could include inter alia: 
• Reservoir pressure and, where applicable, pressure footprint 
 
• Vertical and horizontal extents of the CO2 plume 
 
• Surface displacements 
 
Demonstrating conformance is technically challenging because a perfect match between 
observed and modelled behaviour, that is also demonstrably unique, is likely to be 
impossible to achieve. The aim of CO2CARE research therefore has focussed on three 
related elements: 
• To show that predictive modelling capability increases systematically with time as 
monitoring data is progressively acquired. This indicates that storage processes are 
well understood. 
• To show that as more monitoring data is acquired through time, uncertainties 
progressively reduce, but focus must still be maintained on the less likely ‘end-
member’ model scenarios to avoid the possibility of unexpected or divergent future 
outcomes. 
• To show that, at site abandonment, predictive models calibrated by monitoring data 
can reduce the uncertainty envelope sufficiently for unexpected or divergent future 
outcomes to be ruled out. 
The conformance modelling and monitoring studies carried out at Sleipner and Ketzin have 
focussed on plume extents and reservoir pressure evolution respectively6. The results from 
this type of conformance assessment would be used to provide model- monitoring offset 
(MMO) data to input to the risk management activities such as the traffic light system 
(Section 3.1.2). 
2.1.1. CO2 plume evolution at Sleipner 
In the case of the commercial-scale Sleipner project, multiple 2D (axisymmetric) and 3D 
reservoir simulations were compared to results of 3D time-lapse seismics. Research 
focussed on predicting and measuring the progressive development of the CO2 plume. 
Conformance testing was based on a number of performance criteria: 
                                               
6 CO2CARE deliverable D3.3: “Processing and modelling using measurements and geophysical 
forward (history matched) modelling”. 
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• Plume footprint area  
• Maximum lateral migration distance of CO2 from the injection point  
• Area of CO2 accumulation trapped at top reservoir  
• Volume of CO2 accumulation trapped at top reservoir  
• Area of all CO2 layers summed  
• Spreading co-efficient  (storage efficiency)7 
 
Figure 3. Predictions (axisymmetric model) based on baseline information showing single 
layer and multi-layer plumes (left) and predicted / observed ranges for one of the performance 
measures (plume footprint area) 
Initial predictions in 1996, using only baseline observations, with no plume monitoring data, 
had a high degree of uncertainty (Figure 3) arising mostly from uncertainty in how the CO2 
would be trapped within the reservoir. Possibilities ranged from a single layer at the reservoir 
top or several layers at different levels within the reservoir. As a consequence, performance 
measures, such as plume area footprint, had high range of possibilities. 
Monitoring data, comprising a suite of repeat 3D seismic surveys (Figure 4), was able to 
confirm that CO2 was trapped at multiple levels within the reservoir, and provide additional 
constraints such as arrival time of the CO2 at the reservoir top, estimation of CO2 flux into the 
topmost layer and individual layer extents. Improved reservoir temperature data also 
became available as the injection progressed.  
 
                                               
7 The spreading co-efficient is the plume footprint area divided by the total (summed) area of all the layers in the plume and 
gives a measure of the efficiency of lateral spread of the plume. Thus, a single layer plume would have an SC of 1.0, whereas 
multiple layered plumes would have an SC <1. 
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Figure 4. A subset of the time-lapse seismics showing progressive development of multi-layer 
plume (top) and of the plume spatial footprint (bottom) 
 
Subsequent predictions (2001, 2006) included only multi-layer plumes (Figure 5), so end-
member possibilities were much closure together. 
 
Figure 5. Plume predictions (axisymmetric model) showing end-members based on 1996, 2001 
and 2006 datasets 
As a result, predicted ranges for the performance measures are much reduced (Figure 6) 
and the likelihood of the end-members leading to unexpected or divergent future outcomes 
is much reduced. 
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Figure 6. Predictions (axisymmetric model) of one of the performance measures (plume 
footprint area) showing progressive decrease in uncertainty through time 
 
A key performance measure that cannot be accurately assessed by the axisymmetric 
modelling is the lateral migration of the topmost layer of the plume, directly beneath the 
topseal (whose topography is known from the baseline data). Initial 3D models based on 
1996 data had a very wide spread, but uncertainty reduced markedly as the time-lapse 
datasets became available (Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Predicted development of the topmost layer of CO2 in the plume by 2008 (3D model) 
showing progressive decrease in uncertainty through time 
 
It is clear however that even by 2006, a perfect prediction of the 2008 plume was not easily 
obtainable. This is due to continued (though much reduced) geological uncertainty and also 
to likely limitations in the predictive model itself. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the basic 
process of layer development (buoyancy-driven migration by fill-spill beneath the topseal 
topography) is well understood. As more monitoring data is acquired uncertainty will reduce 
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still further and the likelihood of unexpected divergent future outcomes is very small. Thus, 
as more seismic data became available, predictive models could be matched more 
accurately to the observations and became more reliable predictors of future performance.  
2.1.2. Reservoir pressure evolution at Ketzin 
Monitoring wells, equipped with pressure and temperature sensors, provide direct 
observations concerning the propagation and the physical state of the CO2 plume. These 
direct monitoring installations complement the more indirect geophysical observations from 
the Earth surface (such as 3D seismics). For the Ketzin pilot site, pressure data from the 
injection and monitoring wells, arrival times of the CO2 plume at the monitoring wells, and 
the lateral and vertical extension of the CO2 plume in the reservoir were monitored, 
simulated, and compared as a performance measure.  
Matching the recorded pressure data at the injection well and CO2 arrival times at both 
observation wells of the Ketzin pilot site required the introduction of distinct near-well and 
far-field permeability tensors. Taking this into account, simulation results using different 
simulation software tools showed a good to excellent agreement of simulated and observed 
pressures, with a maximum pressure mismatch of about 1 bar (Figure 8).  
Regarding the arrival times, the model reacted very sensitively to geological features which 
can change greatly locally when different mesh resolutions are applied. Thus, a matching of 
the arrival time - trying to predict an event at a single point, is associated with large 
uncertainty regarding the underlying geological model. Our recommendation is that this type 
of observation should not be used as a key measure of prediction performance. 
 
  
Figure 8. History-matching of modelled and observed reservoir pressures at Ketzin, showing 
accuracy of post-2011 prediction. 
 
Comparisons of horizontal and vertical CO2 plume distribution between simulations and 
monitoring data (commonly repeat 3D seismic surveys) must take into account detectability 
and resolution issues for the time-lapse monitoring surveys. This may be done by seismic 
modelling incorporating realistic signal-noise ratios and involving different saturation 
scenarios and considering homogeneous as well as patchy CO2 distribution. If the CO2 is 
accumulated in thin layers only, these may remain undetected by surface geophysical 
measurements. Also, in CO2-saturated rock mass, units with low saturation (below 20% CO2 
saturation) may be hard to detect, as demonstrated in simulation studies performed for the 
Ketzin pilot site.  
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2.1.3. Conclusions on conformance 
 
3D time-lapse seismics and down-hole pressure measurements are proven technologies 
and have been the key monitoring tools for reservoir management at the CO2CARE sites. It 
is likely that this will be the case for storage sites elsewhere, albeit with varying site-specific 
requirements. It is also worth stressing that the roughly two yearly repeat survey frequency 
at Sleipner mostly reflects the requirements for monitoring the deeper gas field. A dedicated 
monitoring programme for the CO2 storage site would very likely involve a much lower time-
lapse repeat frequency. Other tools are likely to be of complementary value in certain 
situations; down-hole logging and fluid sampling to characterise longer-term stabilization 
processes for example. 
From the examples shown above, it is clear that as more monitoring data becomes available 
during the course of a project, and the initial model is adapted to produce a better match with 
it, conformance improves dramatically. Nevertheless perfect matching is likely to be 
impossible due to the various limitations of model resolution, model parameters, 
observational limitations and other residual uncertainties. It is important for regulators to 
accept this and realise that at a certain, less than perfect, level of conformance (which will be 
very site-specific) it can still be clear that the key storage processes are robustly understood.  
Quality of future performance prediction also improves progressively as more monitoring 
data becomes available, resulting in a progressive reduction in uncertainty. However, a key 
aspect is to maintain a sufficiently wide range of predictive scenarios, such that any 
reasonable outcome will fall within it. Measurements that fall outside the predicted range are 
likely to be embarrassing for the Operator and may trigger remediation requirements if they 
look likely to result in unexpected outcomes. It is important therefore to focus strongly on the 
end-members of the predicted range, particularly those that might lead to divergent future 
outcomes. It is important for regulators to realise that a level of residual uncertainty in the 
predictive modelling is unavoidable and acceptable, provided that the end-members of the 
predicted range will not lead to unacceptable outcomes.  
A possible example of this is the predicted future plume at Ketzin (see below). Although the 
exact spatial disposition of the plume in future is uncertain, all of the predicted range lies 
within a stable outcome – the plume will migrate into a closed trapping structure.  
 
2.2. Demonstrating 'No detectable leakage' 
Leakage is defined in the EU Directive as the migration of CO2 outside of the Storage 
Complex. Note that leakage is not synonymous with surface emission of CO2, but leakage 
detection might, in certain circumstances, give early warning of future emissions. Leakage 
measurement in might provide an upper bound on a future or concurrent surface emission. 
Migration out of the Storage Complex might be either upwards, laterally or even downwards 
- the latter perhaps in dissolved form. In CO2CARE we have focussed on assessing 
techniques for detecting the upward (buoyant) migration of CO2 through the overburden 
where detection requires some form of robust spatial coverage of potentially large 
geographical areas. Any form of point-wise or profile based detection tool has deficiencies in 
this respect due to spatial sampling issues (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Point sampling or profile-based detection techniques are potentially very sensitive if 
carried out in the vicinity of the leak, but are susceptible to missing or only partially detecting 
leaks which fall between the sampling points or profiles. 
One approach is by pressure detection in a suitably permeable monitoring horizon closely 
above the Storage Complex. Issues associated with this have been explored at other 
storage sites (e.g. Meckel et al. 2008, Taoa et al. 2013). 
In CO2CARE we have focussed on the leakage detection ability of 3D time-lapse seismics8. 
The technique can provide robust and uniform spatial subsurface coverage of the 
overburden above the storage reservoir particularly in offshore situations. This is applicable 
to all storage reservoir types, be they aquifers or depleted hydrocarbon fields. Accumulations 
of CO2 in the overburden, either as sub-horizontal layers or sub-vertical ‘chimneys’, will lead 
to changes in reflectivity and time-shifts. These are extremely sensitive to even small 
amounts of CO2. 
A key factor in the ability of time-lapse data to detect small time-dependent changes is the 
degree to which successive datasets can be accurately repeated. Perfect repeatability would 
produce a noise-free difference dataset capable of detecting very small time-lapse changes. 
In practice, repeatability is far from perfect - difference datasets suffer from a variable 
amount of repeatability error or noise which acts to obscure real changes in signal. 
Repeatability noise has essentially three causes:  
• changes in ambient noise on repeat surveys which lead to an overprint of essentially 
random repeatability noise 
• changes in acquisition parameters (e.g. source/receiver characteristics, recording 
geometry) which give imperfect repeat imaging of the subsurface and lead to 
repeatability noise which adumbrates the geological reflectivity 
• In onshore datasets, changes in elastic properties of the near-surface low-velocity 
layer due to varying humidity and necessitating updated static corrections for 
repeated time-lapse surveys 
 
Detection threshold therefore depends on repeatability noise (Figure 10) and is therefore 
highly site and position dependent (varying with depth and depending on seismic quality, 
repeatability, geology and CO2 properties). It is also a statistical measure varying with both 
the thickness and area of a CO2 accumulation, and trade-offs therein. CO2CARE work at 
                                               
8 CO2CARE deliverable D3.5: “Report on monitoring techniques for site abandonment based on site 
portfolio”. 
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Sleipner shows that accumulations of CO2 at the top of the reservoir with masses of around 
7000 tonnes can easily be imaged, with a statistically-determined detection threshold of 
around 2100 tonnes. In the overburden detection thresholds are likely to be even lower, 
perhaps as small as a few hundred tonnes in favourable circumstances at certain depths.  
 
Figure 10. Seismic line through the Sleipner CO2 plume and overburden (top) with horizontal 
time-slice maps showing time-lapse changes in the overburden (bottom). Random signal 
across the time-slice is due to repeatability noise, levels of which limit the detectability of real 
changes due to CO2.  
 
The question then arises as to the significance of the term ‘no detectable leakage’ in the 
context of finite detection capability. We can relate detection capability to the leakage limit 
required to fulfil a storage site’s emissions mitigation objective. Hepple and Benson (2003) 
have suggested that an average annual leakage rate of 0.01% per year for storage sites 
would enable us to stabilise atmospheric CO2 concentrations below 550 ppm and other 
studies have cited similar figures. 
Let us take a hypothetical case injecting 5 Mt of CO2 per year into the Utsira Sand for 20 
years, giving a total injected amount of 100 Mt. If such a site were to leak 0.01% of injected 
CO2 per year from the start of injection, then, at site closure, around 100 kt would have 
leaked out. Such an amount should be readily detectable and the ’no detected leakage’ 
criterion would be failed. Looked at another way, a leaked amount of only 1000 tonnes 
(compatible with leakage detection thresholds in the Sleipner overburden), would correspond 
to an annual leakage rate of only 0.0001%. This is two orders of magnitude below the 
effective mitigation criterion and so, ‘no detected leakage’ in such a situation would provide 
robust confirmation that the site was meeting its emissions mitigation objectives.  
It is recommended therefore that regulators use the term ‘no detectable leakage’ in the 
context of whether a site is performing effectively in terms of emissions mitigation. In practice 
it is likely that a regulator will also require that detectability limits are sufficient to ensure that 
necessary health and safety objectives are met. 
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2.3. Demonstrating long-term stabilization  
The long-term security of storage sites over time-spans of 1,000-10,000 years has been the 
focus of various types of modelling studies involving predictions and extrapolations. It is 
generally accepted that four CO2 trapping processes (buoyancy trapping, capillary trapping, 
dissolution and mineralisation), operating on progressively longer time-scales, are key to the 
process of site stabilization. One of the very first published illustrations of this was a fully 
conceptual diagram of time evolution of trapping proportions by these mechanisms (Fig. 
111), included in the IPCC Special Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (IPCC 
2005).  
 
Figure 11. Re-coloured version of the conceptual diagram from 
IPCC 2005). The concept is that the safety of the site is linked 
to the significant reduction in the mobile phase for CO2 (red), 
whereas the proportion trapped in residual phase by capillary 
forces (green), the dissolved CO2 in the water (blue), and the 
precipitation of minerals incorporating the CO2 (purple) 
steadily increases over time. 
 
 
A CO2CARE meta-study of published results from simulations of long-term trapping in a 
variety of potential storage sites9 shows that there might be significant deviations from the 
conceptual description. The only consistent agreement seems to be the very limited amount 
of mineral trapping on the thousand year timescale. 
Despite the uneven background data for the meta-study, and sometimes the lack of 
information about input for the simulations, it seems clear that the trapping diagram must be 
highly site-specific. The distribution of trapping between the different mechanisms depends 
on reservoir architecture, depth, brine salinity, and injection strategy. This diversity among 
different injection sites is exemplified with a few examples (Fig. 12). 
 
  
Figure 12. Trapping diagrams (colours as above) constructed from results in Audigane (2007). 
Zhang (2009) and Ranganathan (2011).  
 
It is clear that fully coupled modelling of all the trapping processes is computationally very 
demanding, and that the suggested upscaling strategy for the geochemical modelling must 
be developed further to allow assessment of this trapping contribution. A recommended 
addition to these studies is to engage also in sensitivity studies and mapping of the 
uncertainty in the trapping estimates, since we have learned that some of the input 
                                               
9 CO2CARE Deliverable D3.1: “Review of relevant trapping mechanisms based on site portfolio”. 
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parameters can have significant effect on the results that are commonly based on long-term 
extrapolations. 
Uncertainty can be addressed by multiple model realisations and statistical analysis. A long-
term predictive modelling exercise was carried out for the Ketzin site to assess CO2 plume 
behaviour during the post-closure period, especially in the far-field region where the 
uncertainty in the reservoir heterogeneity is high. The study used the most recent and 
history-matched static model developed for the Ketzin site. In order to model these 
uncertainties, 25 stochastic realisations of fluvial channel distributions, that represent some 
of the possible far-field heterogeneities, were created and implemented in the flow 
simulations. Further details of the methodology proposed and recommendations made are 
presented in Section 3.2.  
Because predictive modelling of long-term processes is subject to significant uncertainty, it is 
likely to be necessary to provide additional knowledge support for the stabilization process. 
This can include observed monitoring data from storage sites already in the post-injection 
phase such as Nagaoka (Sato et al. 2011), experimental data, or geological analogues 
which demonstrate stabilization processes and time-scales.  
 
 
Figure 13. Photograph of the upper part of a laboratory Hele-Shaw cell, containing a water-
filled porous medium, showing dissolution of CO2 and sinking plumes (yellow) of CO2 
saturated water (after 90 minutes).  
As an illustration, in order to assess the possible efficacy of dissolution as a trapping 
process, CO2CARE has run a series of experiments to observe the onset of convection 
(density-driven sinking) as CO2 dissolves in reservoir brine10 (Fig. 13). 
For these very long-term processes, there is a need to collate and integrate knowledge from 
very disparate sources and approaches, and there is a strong argument for setting up a 
worldwide learning platform on this topic. 
 
  
                                               
10 CO2CARE deliverable D3.4: “Assessment of long-term integrity and site stabilisation by coupled 
THMC modelling”. 
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3. Recommendations for risk management 
The main elements of managing the environmental and safety risks of CO2 storage are well 
embedded in the rules of the Storage Directive, which are risk assessment, monitoring and 
corrective measures. The detailed requirements for risk assessment are laid down in Annex I 
of the Directive and the requirements for monitoring are described in Annex II of the 
Directive. The need for a corrective measure plan is described in Article 16 of the Directive. 
More technical details of CO2 storage risk management are provided in the Guidance 
Documents accompanying the Storage Directive. The present chapter directs particular 
attention to risk management activities for the closure and transfer of responsibility of a CO2 
storage site. 
 
3.1. Risk management plan 
The risk management plan developed in the CO2CARE project is designed to meet the 
requirements of the Directive for site closure and transfer of responsibility for the site to the 
CA. However, risk management activities, i.e. the cycle of risk assessment, monitoring and 
risk reducing measures, should be continuously revolving during all phases of the CO2 
storage lifetime and is thus not exclusive to the closure milestone and the post-closure 
phases of a CO2 storage project. In fact, risk management in terms of assessment and 
planning actually starts in the site qualification phase. An application for a storage permit 
should already address the major items required for site closure and post-closure, albeit in a 
provisional way. These include the risk management plan, post-closure plan, transfer 
requirements, and abandonment plan.  
Just as the early phases of the storage project life cycle deal with the planning of the closure 
and post-closure activities, the latest stages focus on updating the plans and implementing 
them. The risk management plan for the site closure and post-closure phases assumes that 
a complete risk assessment and a set of plans, with optional updates made during the 
operational phase, are available once a project moves into the final stages of the operational 
phase. 
Risk Management in the context of closing and abandoning a CO2 storage site 
encompasses all the measures required to demonstrate the site’s long-term safety. The 
latter represents a pre-condition for transfer of the responsibility for the abandoned site from 
the operator to the CA. 
Monitoring is an essential element in risk management, not only during the operational 
phase of a CO2 storage project but also in the post-operational phase. Appropriate site-
specific monitoring measures need to be set up very early in the project life cycle, during the 
licensing procedure for a CO2 storage site, which marks the starting-point for demonstrating 
how the requirements for the transfer of responsibility can be met. 
 
3.1.1. Timeline and milestones 
The timeline considered by the risk management plan developed during the CO2CARE 
project encompasses the final part of the injection period within the operational phase as 
well as the post-closure/pre-transfer and post-transfer phases of a storage project. Figure 17 
illustrates the timeline of the project phases covered by the CO2CARE risk management 
plan, i.e. the final stages of the operational phase, the post-closure/pre-transfer and the post-
transfer phase (Phases 4-6 of EC GD3). It also shows a proposed breakdown of the 
operation phase and post closure/pre-transfer phase into 3 sub-phases, based on the terms 
used in the Directive, namely:  
• final operational sub-phase (Part of Phase 4, including site closure) 
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• post-closure sub-phase (first phase of Phase 5) 
pre-transfer sub-phase (second phase of Phase 5, including transfer of the site) 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Timeline for CO2 storage site closure risk management modified after EC Guidance 
Document 3. M=milestone defined in DIRECTIVE 2009/31/EC, SCM= New defined Site-Closure 
Milestones for risk management of CO2 storage site closure 
 
In order to provide a well-structured procedure for risk management within these project 
phases and sub-phases, 17 Site-Closure Milestones (SCM) have been introduced that we 
recommend should be implemented during the relevant project phases The milestones are 
closely linked to the requirements of the Directive and describe key actions or key moments 
in time during site closure and transfer. 
The SCMs are ordered on a chronological basis allowing the operator and the CA to monitor 
the progress of the preparations for transfer. The requirements of Article 18 of the Directive 
have been integrated into the proposed set of milestones, thus ensuring that all conditions 
for transfer of responsibility are fulfilled when the set of milestones is passed. 
The correspondence between SCMs and timeline is summarised in Table 2. It is important 
that the milestones should be passed in the order given in Table 2. For instance, the final 
evaluation of the absence of leakage must be undertaken after accordance of modelling and 
monitoring data have been demonstrated, i.e. the behaviour of the storage complex is shown 
to be understood by the operator. 
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Table 3. Site-closure milestone chart leading to the transfer of responsibility according to 
Article 18 (EC Storage Directive) 
Site-
Closure 
Milestone 
(SCM) 
Description Sub-Phase 
Phase/ 
Moment 
0 Specify models and monitoring selected for conformity check 
Fi
na
l O
pe
ra
tio
n 
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l 1 Check model/monitoring conformity during final operational phase; if necessary update models 
2 Provisional post-closure plan updated 
3 Final (updated) post-closure plan submitted 
4 Final (updated) post-closure plan approved 
5 Site Closure - Site Closure 
6 Optional update of risk management plan 
Po
st
-C
lo
su
re
 
Po
st
-C
lo
su
re
/P
re
-T
ra
ns
fe
r 
7 Model check-update loop terminates 
8 
Models and monitoring data are within acceptable 
conformance after M7 has been reached without significant 
adjustment (EC GD3 proposes a minimum period of five 
years) 
9 Optional final update of risk management plan 
10 Evidence of absence of leakage presented to CA 
11 Effectiveness of storage concept: Evolution to long-term stability demonstrated 
11a Pressure evolution demonstrated to match model prediction 
11b Plume movement is demonstrated to be an acceptable match to model predictions (within tolerances) 
11c Verification of other (optional) parameters/features related to the storage concept 
12 Final wellbore check before abandonment (final well logging) 
13 (Draft) Report for transfer of responsibility submitted 
Pr
e-
Tr
an
sf
er
 
14 Report approved 
15 Surface facilities removed 
16 Well abandonment accepted 
17 Transfer of responsibility approved and accomplished - Site Transfer 
 
3.1.2. Judgment criteria for milestones 
As the SCMs are defined at a high level, they have to be complemented with more specific 
risk management (R-type) and technical (T-type) criteria that can be applied on an 
operational level to determine whether the site closure milestones have been reached.  
The risk management criteria, termed “R-type” criteria (Table 4), have been directly 
extracted from the risk management plan presented in Table 3. 
Some of these R-type criteria refer to input from the verification of modelling by the results of 
monitoring. Parameters are predicted by modelling and measured by monitoring to verify the 
conformity of actual and modelled behaviour as stated in the Directive. For risk 
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management-related treatment of such parameters, requiring comparison of modelled and 
measured data, a traffic light system with an associated workflow has been set up (Fig. 16). 
This workflow provides an additional set of technical criteria (“T-type” criteria), specifically 
relating to model-monitoring conformity. The major goal of the traffic light system is to 
provide a framework for dealing with offsets (differences) between model predictions and 
monitoring data (MMO, i.e. model monitoring offset). 
The three criteria levels, fundamental criteria of the Directive, R-type criteria and T-type 
criteria, have been connected to each other in order to form a practical generic set of criteria 
for CO2 storage site abandonment and the transfer of responsibility to a Competent Authority 
(CA). 
Table 4. List of the criteria derived from Risk Management Plan (R-type criteria) 
R-type 
criteria Description of criteria 
EC requirements and Site 
Closure Milestones 
Sub-
Phase 
R1 Pressure evolution conforms to the reservoir models 
Absence of leakage 
(SCM10 & SCM12) 
Po
st
-C
lo
su
re
 
R2 No detectable indication of leakage by monitoring measures 
R3 
Evidence for the location of the CO2-plume within 
the storage site by periodic seismic surveys or 
other appropriate measures 
R4 
Leakage has not been detected for at least 10 
years, this period may include the operational 
phase 
R5 Well integrity is checked directly before abandonment according to best practices 
R6 Model recalibration iteration loop ends and model 
recalibration not required any more Conformity of Monitoring 
data and model predictions 
(SCM7 & SCM8) R7 
Model recalibration iteration loop ended at least 
five years ago 
R8 Pressure is developing towards an equilibrium pressure and according to models 
Site evolution towards long 
term stability 
(SCM11) 
R9 Plume movement is matching model predictions 
R10 Plume is not moving out of the storage site, confirmed by modelling and monitoring 
R11 Optional verification of other parameters/features related to the storage concept 
 
In order to assess whether R-type criteria which invoke model-monitoring verification are 
met, a traffic light system, explained in the next section, has been set up. The traffic light 
system establishes whether or not the monitoring and modelling data are in compliance and 
provides a procedure for handling offsets of observed and predicted data. Figure 15 shows 
the high level criteria of the EC Directive, the associated R-type criteria, and when to deploy 
the traffic light system. Table 5 indicates which T-type criteria are to be assessed on the 
basis of this traffic light system. The scheme depicted in Figure 16 has to be applied 
independently for any parameter subject to monitoring and modelling within the scope 
of a storage project.  
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Figure 15. List of criteria for post-operational decision making and responsibility transfer as 
well as the interconnection between the fundamental, R-type criteria, and the traffic light 
system 
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Figure 16. Flow diagram of the traffic light system for risk-related decision making in the post-
closure sub-phase and definition of the three risk priorities (status red, orange and green). 
MMO= model-monitoring offset, RM = risk management 
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Table 5. List of the criteria derived from the traffic light approach (T-type criteria). 
Crit. Description General criterion 
T1 Models and monitoring of required site-specific monitoring parameters are implemented yes 
T2 A list of prioritised models is in place and the mandatory models are implemented yes 
T3 Duration of the time interval to check for MMO no 
T4 Relative amount of the tolerable MMO  no 
T5 Accuracy/precision of monitoring technique no 
T6 Accuracy/precision of models no 
T7 Does a gathered MMO refer to site irregularity or is model recalibration required? no 
T8 In case of site failure: Are the primary and all connected irregularities identified? no 
T9 In case of site failure: are all required RM measures ready to be applied?  no 
T10 Are the irregularities eliminated by the RM measures applied? no 
T11 Is there data to improve the site knowledge? no 
 
The development of the above approach to defining criteria to enable transfer of 
responsibility for the site to the CA11 revealed that, although based upon a generic 
framework, the definition of such criteria is highly site dependent. In particular, the definition 
of tolerable model-monitoring deviations and accuracies/precisions of models is ambiguous 
and requires thorough consideration and agreement between the operator of the site and the 
CA.  
Please note that the application of the traffic light system is not limited to the final operational 
and post-operational phases, but can also be deployed in earlier stages of the storage 
project whenever a mismatch between modelled and observed site behaviour has occurred. 
 
3.1.3. Minimum periods in the Directive to fulfil criteria for transfer 
The Directive and its Guidance Documents (GDs) propose minimum periods to fulfil certain 
key criteria, which are not based on any scientific fundamentals. It is recommended that the 
decision as to whether a criterion for the safety of a site has been met should be based on 
technical criteria only and should not be linked to prescriptive time spans. Instead, a post-
operational CO2 storage site should be sealed as soon as possible after all criteria for the 
transfer have been fulfilled and the Competent Authority is satisfied that the long-term 
integrity of the storage site has been sufficiently proven11.  
                                               
11 The definition of criteria for transfer of responsibility and abandonment, and the developed workflow are presented in detail 
in two separate public CO2CARE documents available via the CO2CARE web portal: Report D4.12 “Plan for risk management 
supporting site abandonment” (CO2CARE, 2013b) and Report D4.22 “Criteria for decision making in site abandonment” 
(CO2CARE, 2013c). The traffic light system and a case example of how to deal with an observed model-monitoring offset 
(MMO) is presented in detail in the latter document (explaining the nodes used in the system). 
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3.1.4. Irregularities 
The Directive states that if significant irregularities occur during the storage process, 
corrective measures specified in a risk management plan have to be taken in order to ensure 
the safety of the site. According to Article 3 (17) of the Directive, a “significant irregularity” is 
defined as any irregularity (or non-conformance) during the injection, post-injection/pre-
closure or post-closure phase, which pose a risk of leakage or implies a risk to the 
environment or humans. 
Hence, irregular site behaviour can be defined as a state or predicted evolution of the site 
which deviates from the expected behaviour. Parameters or indicators of irregular behaviour 
(such as pressure or plume extent) need to be identified and one or more threshold values 
need to be defined for non-conformance. As mentioned above, it is not clearly technically 
specified a priori what constitutes an irregularity (MMO, i.e. “Model Monitoring Offset”) and 
which deviations of the project plan (e.g. Monitoring-Model-Conformance) or uncertainty 
ranges (e.g. for models) are acceptable. This connects directly with the high level criterion of 
conformance of real and predicted behaviour in the Directive but, for site-specific reasons, 
technical criteria constituting an irregularity can probably only be defined by agreement 
between the site operator and the CA. 
The other two fundamental abandonment criteria (absence of significant risks and site 
evolution to a stable situation) also rely - at least partly - on monitoring and predictive model 
data. Thus, MMO is a central issue in decision making. Therefore, a traffic light decision 
support system (Figure 16) has been set up to enable the operator and CA to determine 
whether model predictions and monitoring data are in agreement, and any irregularity is 
being appropriately managed. The workflow has been evaluated thoroughly on the K12-B 
CO2 injection site12 and the practicality of the proposed traffic light workflow can be 
demonstrated. 
It is recommended that threshold values for irregular behaviour and tolerances for deviations 
should be agreed upon by the Competent Authority (CA) after discussion with the Operator, 
and it is recognised that these will depend greatly on the characteristics of each individual 
site. As stated GD3: “The choice of the percentage (of monitoring-modelling offset) would be 
determined by the CA and different ranges of tolerances can be specified for each particular 
measured parameter in order to determine conformity. The CA should specify the applicable 
percentages for various parameters for each storage site at the time of the storage permit, 
taking account of site specific characteristics”. 
Predictive models are key tools in the risk assessment and management process. On the 
other hand it is clear that a model can never replicate monitoring data perfectly or uniquely. It 
is advisable therefore to maintain a range of predictive modelled scenarios during the 
lifetime of the project. The modelled range would include the preferred or most likely 
scenarios, but also scenario end-members in order to track whether unacceptable ‘divergent’ 
outcomes remain possible. In some circumstances statistical (e.g. Bayesian) tools might be 
appropriate to help quantify the likelihood of certain scenarios and outcomes occurring (see 
below).  
3.2. Uncertainty analysis for leakage risk assessment  
It is recognised that mobile CO2 phase in the storage reservoir has a tendency to follow the 
general topography of the reservoir/caprock interface and migrate up dip with time, further 
beyond the area the plume is located at the time of site closure. This observation has 
implications for storage risk assessment and site monitoring during CO2 injection and post 
closure. For example at Ketzin, above-zone pressure monitoring, which allows the probing 
for brine leakage of a wider area beyond the current CO2 plume footprint, has been 
                                               
12 CO2CARE Deliverable D4.22: “Criteria for decision making in site abandonment”. 
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employed to ensure that CO2 would be contained by structural trapping as it migrates up an 
anticline and, according to model predictions, eventually rests against a fault.  
To facilitate leakage risk assessment, it is recommended to divide the simulated CO2 plume 
footprint broadly into a transient (free CO2 largely passing through) and a non-transient 
source regions. A third region – the near wellbore region - may also be defined to evaluate 
the source for potential leakage through the injection well. The amount of free CO2 in 
different regions over time can then be tracked, through reservoir modelling, to evaluate 
when and for how long the leakage risk might be present in any given region, as well as the 
size of the source available for leakage. Considering the uncertainty in reservoir 
heterogeneity and the petrophysical properties used in simulations, especially in the far-field 
region at the time of site closure, long term assessment of the plume migration should 
involve the use of multiple realisations of the reservoir model whilst honouring the available 
4D seismic data. Represented as the free CO2 distribution probability maps in time and 
space, the results of these simulations can then be used for post-closure leakage risk 
assessment (Figure 17). 
For quantitative leakage assessment, potential CO2 leakage through a leaky patch of the 
caprock should be simulated for different scenarios regarding the leakage path permeability 
and detection threshold. The outcome of this step would be the mapping of leakage profiles 
(magnitude and duration) at different caprock locations within the plume footprint. This 
knowledge would be significant in informing both the monitoring strategy and appropriate 
remediation methods for a storage site, during the post-closure period in particular. 
The overall risk management for a storage site would combine the properties of leakage 
pathways (leakage probability, likely rates etc.) for an individual risk component identified 
(such as natural or induced pathways in the caprock, failed injection well cement or 
abandoned wells) and assess risk and the associated uncertainty for a storage site in 
conjunction with the source behaviour.  
 
 
(a) 2023 
 
(b) 2043 
 
(c) 2063  
 
 
Figure 17. Probability map of the mobile CO2 distribution at the top layer of the reservoir in 
years: (a) 2023; (b) 2043; (c) 2063 at Ketzin.  
 
3.3. Monitoring strategies – pre and post transfer  
The design of a monitoring strategy fits naturally into the pre- and the post-transfer phases. 
 
3.3.1. Pre-transfer phase 
The monitoring strategy in the pre-transfer phase will depend on the geological conditions of 
the site and will focus on fulfilling the remaining risk management requirements and 
completing the evidence-base upon which the three transfer criteria depend (no detected 
leakage, conformance and long-term stabilisation). 
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The monitoring programme will generally continue the same suite of monitoring surveys as 
was deployed before closure. However, survey coverage will likely become temporally and 
spatially sparser, so that time intervals between repeat campaigns will become longer, and 
repeat surveys might become more focussed with a reduced quantity or spatial coverage of 
observations, depending on the post-closure risk scenarios. An example of this would be 
concentrating on detecting possible leakage related to specific identified risk locations rather 
than necessarily monitoring the whole storage footprint.  
 
3.3.2. Post-transfer phase 
At the point of transfer the storage site will have met the rather stringent requirements laid 
down by the Directive, so post-transfer monitoring is expected to be minimal.  
 
A hypothetical example can be drawn from the Sleipner dry-run, wherein injection was 
assumed to have ceased in 2006. Thus monitoring during the pre-transfer phase will have 
verified the following performance details:  
 
1) Plume is migrating, as predicted, into the northern structural closure.  
 
2) Plume is not migrating towards a wellbore 
 
3) No CO2 is detected in the overburden 
 
4) Intra-reservoir CO2 layers are developing as predicted 
 
In addition, as pointed out in the Sleipner Dry-run document13, the three transfer criteria have 
been satisfactorily addressed so it is proposed that no post-transfer monitoring is required. 
 
For public acceptance purposes however, it is suggested that a further shallow survey be 
acquired to image and sample any bubble-streams at seabed to confirm nothing unusual is 
happening. 
 
3.4. Tool for comparison of modelling and monitoring data  
One of the requirements of the Directive is that modelling results are verified by comparison 
with monitoring results. Monitoring data can never constrain a model in full so it is prudent to 
keep a range of models up and running during the lifetime of the storage site (which is not 
common practice with reservoir engineers).  
At site transfer a final choice of the most appropriate model should be made. To this end a 
tool was developed which enabled a statistical comparison of monitoring data with a suite of 
model outcomes and selection of the most appropriate model(s)14. 
 
3.5. The risk matrix 
The CO2CARE site ‘Dry-run’ closure documents13 have included a ‘Risk Matrix’. This is a 
device that assigns non-conformances or other undesirable ‘events’ that might occur during 
storage operations to a matrix on the basis of their likelihood and the severity of 
consequence should they occur. 
                                               
13 CO2CARE Deliverable D5.3: “Final ‘Dry-Run’ for Site Abandonment and Transfer of Responsibility: 
Sleipner, K12-B and Ketzin”. 
14 More details on this tool are to be found in CO2CARE deliverables D4.4: “” and D4.5: “”. 
D5.4 Best Practice Guidelines 
42 
 
 
 
Figure 18. The Risk Matrix for CO2 storage, a) After DNV (2010) b) Suggested modification 
herein 
Introduced as part of CO2QUALSTORE (DNV 2010) the matrix is essentially a traffic-light 
system designed to guide an operator in the prevention or treatment of potentially serious 
events. Thus, for a storage site, the operator and the regulator should carefully assess the 
likelihood and consequences of identified events and rank the resulting risks according to 
the traffic light system. This will depend on the type and characteristic of a storage site, so 
for example consequences of specific events will likely be completely different for onshore 
and offshore locations. Proposed colour ranking of risks is as follows:  
• Green: low-medium risk; no action needed 
• Yellow: high risk; countermeasures required 
• Red: unacceptable risk; showstopper if no effective countermeasures are available 
The risk matrix proposed in CO2QUALSTORE (Fig. 18a) has a symmetrical arrangement of 
colours, such that, for example, an event of very high consequence but very low likelihood 
(Event 4 in Fig. 18) would have a yellow traffic light risk ranking. Recent events in the oil 
exploration industry have shown that very low probability events do, nevertheless, 
occasionally occur and they can have catastrophic consequences; environmental, financial 
and/or reputational. 
CCS is an immature discipline, currently very much under public scrutiny, and it is essential 
that high consequence, high profile accidents are avoided completely. We recommend 
therefore that the risk matrix be modified such that any event with a very high consequence 
will be allocated the red risk ranking (Fig. 18b). In other words, sites should be designed, 
operated and monitored in such a manner that very high consequence events are, to all 
intents and purposes, impossible.   
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4. Recommendations concerning transfer of responsibility from the 
Operator to the State 
4.1. General observations  
Many of the recommendations below arose from the CO2CARE Dry Runs Regulator’s 
Workshop15. The CO2CARE participants are grateful to the participating regulators for their 
valuable contributions, which provide an important perspective on the transfer of 
responsibility from the Operator to the CA. 
• Acceptance of the Transfer Report (and transfer of responsibility for all legal obligations 
for the site to the CA) marks the end of a process that began with site selection and a 
permit application by the Operator many years previously. It is vital that a relationship 
based on transparency and openness should have developed between the Operator and 
Regulator during that period. Consequently CO2CARE recommends that the CA and 
Operator should ensure that sufficient face-to-face contact to build mutual confidence, 
and to ensure continuity of knowledge through changes of personnel, is built into the 
regulatory process. This, together with the regular reporting requirements that most 
jurisdictions require (e.g. those required under the EU Directive) should help to ensure 
that the transfer report should contain no surprises. 
• Transfer of responsibility for all legal obligations for the storage site from the Operator to 
the CA marks a radical change in the balance of responsibilities between stakeholders in 
a storage project. The CA is ultimately the representative of the public, and this implies 
an acceptance by the public of the benefits and associated liabilities. 
• The Storage Complex should be defined at all stages of the project life cycle from the 
Characterisation phase onwards, because it is a fundamental concept in the Storage 
Directive. The term storage complex means the storage site and surrounding geological 
domain which can have an effect on overall storage integrity and security, that is, 
secondary containment formations. Views of other stakeholders involved or potentially 
involved in this volume and area should be addressed in the transfer report. The limits of 
the Storage Complex could be redefined at any point in the project.  
• Possible interactions with the site from future operations (CO2 storage or other uses), 
and other legitimate users of the subsurface or marine environment, should be 
considered in the transfer report, and any potential hazards of this kind should be 
identified to the CA. Recommendations for risk reduction, risk management and 
mitigation/remediation options for potential post-transfer interactions with other 
subsurface operations should also be included in the transfer report. That said, 
ultimately, only CAs can assess the risks that might arise from operation and closure of 
multiple assets within a storage formation or region. 
4.2. Recommendations for Risk Assessments prior to transfer 
• The risk assessment matrix used in the CO2CARE K12-B and Sleipner risk 
assessments, which ranks the likelihood and consequence of an event, was found useful 
by the regulators (but see Section 3.4). It was also mentioned that more information on 
how the likelihood and consequence of an event were estimated would be useful. 
• As part of the risk assessment, technical criteria that signal significant irregularities 
should be defined for each site. These might be necessary as part of general 
recommendations for the CA when recommending post-transfer monitoring. Threshold 
values would be a part of the definitions in some cases16.  
                                               
15 CO2CARE deliverable D5.2: “Regulators workshop and review”. 
16 See also Section 4.1.1 of this report 
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• Competent Authorities may wish to undertake their own simulations, based on static 
models developed by the operators, to make an independent evaluation and consider 
the effectiveness of monitoring. Static geological models and numerical reservoir 
simulations run on in-house software platforms rather than commercially available 
platforms such as Petrel and Eclipse may not be acceptable for transfer purposes 
because the Competent Authority would not be able to run the models. 
• The participants in the Dry Runs Regulators Workshop felt that there was a lack of clarity 
in the use of terms describing the various phases of the CO2 geological storage project 
life cycle such as closure, post-closure and post-injection, both within the Directive and 
between the Directive and its accompanying Guidance Documents. It was agreed that 
further clarity was needed on the exact order of key stages of the regulatory process 
during the closure, transfer and post-transfer periods. CO2CARE therefore developed 
tools and procedures for a successful closure and transfer of CO2 storage sites17. 
4.3. Recommendations for Transfer Reports 
• The Transfer report has the function of a contract – and it needs to contain key 
messages for the public. The CA is likely to produce a counterpart document as well.  
• From an Operator’s perspective, it may be necessary to include a statement in the 
storage permit along the lines of: “If the storage site performs as predicted, no leakage is 
detected by the monitoring technologies deployed according to the monitoring plan, the 
site is evolving towards a state of long term stability, and all the terms and conditions in 
the storage permit are met, then the Competent Authority will accept transfer of all legal 
obligations for the storage site from the operator”. This would provide comfort to the 
investors and Operator that the State would accept the site back once the storage 
operation had been successfully completed.  
• As predictions of the future site performance are based purely on forward modelling, a 
very large number and range of numerical reservoir simulation runs in which model 
parameters are varied may be necessary to assure the CA of the satisfactory future 
performance of the site. It will also be necessary to conduct modelling of other aspects of 
the site performance, e.g. geomechanical and geochemical stability. Predictions based 
on single lines of evidence are likely to be insufficient.  
• A high level of detail on how models were constructed and how they evolved throughout 
the storage site characterisation, construction and operation should be included. 
Furthermore, information on how such models take uncertainty into account would likely 
be necessary in a transfer report. 
• In the section on conformance of models and monitoring, at least three reasons for 
monitoring should be addressed: monitoring to improve knowledge of the site and its 
performance, early warning of potential departures from modelled performance allowing 
time to intervene, monitoring of the efficacy of corrective measures, technical and social 
baseline needs. 
• Financial arrangements and a plan for post-transfer monitoring need to be made – it is 
too easy and not sufficient to say monitoring can stop; it will be needed as part of the 
CA’s duty of care. 
• The regulators participating in the CO2CARE Dry Runs Regulator’s Workshop indicated 
that liabilities for certain risks will remain with the Operator post-transfer. It is 
recommended that the EC should investigate these views further as they may have 
implications for the Directive or the way in which it is implemented in practice. 
                                               
17 And as a consequence, CO2CARE has made the recommendations given in Section 4.1.1 and 
Section 7. 
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• As CO2 storage is a multi-generational operation, consideration should be given to what 
tools and data should be transferred to the CA. Models may need to be used post-
transfer, if a significant irregularity or leakage was detected.  
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5. Recommendations related to communication with the public  
Communication and engagement with the public is something that should start very early in 
the CO2 storage project life cycle – as soon as, or even before, a site is selected. 
Communication and engagement then should continue throughout the project life cycle, 
including beyond the transfer of liability. Examples of successful engagement for pilot-scale 
research projects are given below. 
5.1. Stakeholder Engagement Strategy for Wallula Basalt Pilot 
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Boise, Inc. under the Big Sky Regional 
Carbon Partnership in August 2013 successfully executed a nominal 1000 tonne CO2 
injection into the Columbia River Basalt at a site located near the township of Wallula in 
Washington State. The success of this pilot project can be traced in large part to effective 
engagement of a broad spectrum of people and organizations in the region designed to build 
understanding and acceptance of the project’s objectives, conduct, and potential benefits. 
However, that engagement did not happen by accident. A formal, written public engagement 
strategy was prepared, reviewed, and approved by the key partners on the project to ensure 
commitment to execution of the strategy throughout the various phases of the pilot project, 
which spanned more than four years. Key aspects of the engagement strategy included: 
• Developing basic project information materials with key messages about the project, 
which were revised and augmented as the project progressed, including information 
for citizens, interest groups, elected officials, and media. 
• Identifying people and organizations in the local area that have an interest in the 
project, and proactively approaching them to explain the purpose, process, and 
expected outcomes of the demonstration, and to learn about their questions and 
concerns. 
• Working to resolve issues raised by stakeholders, and keeping them informed as the 
project proceeded to try to address their concerns and help them appreciate the 
potential contribution of this technology to clean energy and climate change goals. 
• Engaging with local universities to host student tours of the field site and research 
facilities at the national laboratory. 
• Coordinating media and open house events at the field site during important phases 
of the project (i.e. drilling, CO2 injection) with local stakeholders. 
• Identifying and engaging with broader set of stakeholders with a statewide and 
regional view about the potential of emerging technology to address energy and 
climate change goals as a foundation for permitting, sharing results, and potential 
future application of the technologies in areas beyond the immediate Wallula 
community. 
 
The strategy developed represents an overall vision for stakeholder engagement and 
ensures that stakeholders are actively engaged and issues addressed successfully as the 
project transitions from planning, execution, monitoring, and finally closure. 
5.2. Community engagement with the Otway CO2 storage project, Victoria, 
Australia 
Community engagement was made a major priority by the Otway CO2 storage project 
operator (CO2CRC) both in the initial stages and throughout the continuing project.  
5.2.1. Five critical factors that helped successful community engagement 
Ashworth, Rodriguez & Miller (2013) highlight five critical factors that helped in the 
development of a well structured communications plan and affected the outcome of the 
community engagement were: 
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1. Gaining a baseline understanding of perceptions of CCS in the local community 
2. Early, proactive engagement  
3. Establishing trust 
4. Appointment of Community Liaison Officer from the local community  
5. Development of protocols for engaging with local landowners 
5.3. Experiences in Germany: 
The Federal Republic of Germany considers CCS to be a promising key technology to 
reduce CO2 emissions into the atmosphere. However, critical public perception, especially of 
storage, turned out to be a severe hindrance to the development of CCS (TAB 2008). Public 
interest in and opposition to CO2 storage projects has been particularly high in the potential 
target areas. GFZ led the public outreach and acceptance activities associated with the 
CLEAN (Kühn et al., 2012; Hübner et.al 2013) and Ketzin CO2 storage projects. While the 
CLEAN project never entered active injection, the Ketzin pilot site for geological CO2 
storage, which has been operated by GFZ since 2004 near the town Ketzin/Havel in 
Brandenburg (Germany), has been accompanied by an extensive and successful public 
outreach program (Schilling et al., 2009; Martens et al.; 2012, 2013). 
The following recommendations result from a study by Fischedick et al. (2008), and the 
analysis of the two public outreach and acceptance activities based on newspaper articles 
and direct on-site experiences (Kollersberger, pers. communication): 
1) Any information campaign should start as early as possible with contact to the local 
politicians and general public. 
2) Initially, any campaign should first focus on the local stakeholders. 
3) Communicators should be trained individuals with high societal reputation and sound 
scientific background. 
4) Legal and technical aspects as well as the role of CCS as a climate change 
mitigation option should be comprehensively addressed.  
5) A targeted, group-specific communication strategy should be generated. 
6) Transparent information about the research motivation and objectives and factual 
arguments is necessary to allow the general public to make a decision based on 
scientific knowledge and transparent discussion of concerns, benefits and knowledge 
gaps.  
7) The contact with the different stakeholders should be maintained throughout the 
project lifetime. 
8) A visitor centre directly at or near the site including guided tours on-site is able to 
develop trust due to the direct contact with the persons involved in the project 
(Martens et al. 2012).  
9) It is of particular importance to provide a variety of media, information tools and 
materials, tailored to the respective target groups, and to transfer knowledge to 
individuals and groups/institutions with very different background knowledge (Kühn et 
al., 2012, Hübner et al., 2013). 
However, conducting effective public outreach does not necessarily guarantee the success 
of a project or an improved public perception of the project. Acceptance depends on many 
more factors which can only be influenced by public relations to a limited extent (Hübner et 
al., 2013). It must also be stressed that the public reaction to a small-scale, short-term 
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research project is likely to be significantly different to its reaction to the development of a 
permanent industrial-scale storage site. 
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6. Recommendations for the possible modification of Directive 
2009/31/EC of the European Union, on the geological storage of 
carbon dioxide and its associated Guidance Documents 
• The Directive and its Guidance Documents (GDs) propose minimum periods to fulfil 
certain key criteria. These are not based on any scientific fundamentals. It is 
recommended that the decision as to whether a criterion for the safety of a site has been 
met should be based on technical considerations only and should not be linked to a 
prescriptive time span. 
• The significance of the evidence from hydrocarbon exploration and production in meeting 
the requirements for the transfer of responsibility of CO2 storage in hydrocarbon 
reservoirs should be better acknowledged. 
• It is advised to include the system of site-closure milestones and related criteria which 
were developed in CO2CARE, in an updated version of Guidance Document 3. 
• It is recommended that a consistent terminology should be used throughout all relevant 
documents, particularly with respect to phases and sub-phases of the storage lifetime. 
The terminology should be outlined in a “Definition of Terms” section in each document. 
• A generic template for the (preliminary) risk, closure and transfer reports would clarify the 
requirements for passing these steps during the project lifetime and would allow the 
operator (and the regulator) to work towards these from the start of the project. 
• The regulators participating in the CO2CARE Dry Runs Regulator’s Workshop18 
indicated that liabilities for certain risks will remain with the operators post-transfer. It is 
recommended that the EC should investigate national and jurisdictional regulators’ views 
on this further as they may have implications for the Directive or the way in which it is 
implemented in practice. 
• As CO2 storage is a multi-generational operation, consideration should be given to what 
tools and data should be transferred to the CA at site transfer. Models used up to the 
point of transfer may also need to be used post-transfer if a significant irregularity or 
leakage is detected.  
• All leakage monitoring systems have a finite (and site-specific) CO2 detection capability, 
so the question arises as to the usefulness of the term ‘absence of any detectable 
leakage’. Detection capability can be equated to the maximum allowable leakage rate 
consistent with a storage site meeting its greenhouse gas emissions mitigation objective. 
A number of studies have suggested that leakage rates around 0.01% per year or less 
would ensure effective mitigation performance in terms of greenhouses gas reduction 
(see Section 3.2 above). So for a hypothetical large-scale storage project, injecting 
around 100 Mt of CO2, the detection capability of the Sleipner seismics would be some 
two orders of magnitude below the effective mitigation leakage limit. ‘Absence of any 
detectable leakage’ in such a situation would therefore provide robust confirmation that 
the site was meetings its greenhouse gas emissions mitigation objectives. It is 
recommended therefore that regulators use the term “absence of any detectable 
leakage” in the context of whether a site is performing effectively in terms of emissions 
mitigation. 
 
  
                                               
18 CO2CARE deliverable D5.2: “Regulators workshop and review”. 
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